CAUSEWAY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC
NEWSLETTER

Price and Liquidity:

The Winning Combination

Clients have asked us recently about the crippling sovereign fiscal burdens and a future of politically unpopular public debt repayment for Europe, Japan and, yes, the US. We admit the situation doesn't look good. In the next breath, clients question us about developing country economic stability, manufacturing labor wage inflation, and geopolitical tensions. What happens if the euro zone unravels? How can equities possibly thrive in this environment? Global connectivity and a dash of contagion could undermine each region, sending investor risk aversion to levels reminiscent of 2008.

In short, we give the global market meltdown scenario a very low probability in this post-credit-crisis decade. And even if such a highly correlated plunge in investor confidence did happen, it probably wouldn't last long. Why? Because the debt problem largely resides with governments – not with companies. Furthermore, investors are hungry for performance. We all need to pay for retirement, and for those who haven't squirreled away lots of money, fixed income returns won't do the job. Of course, doom & gloom makes for provocative newsletters. Are we blind to the combustible global dangers? Is Causeway attempting to shelter portfolios in cash (or stocks that behave like cash) in our long-only mandates? No to both. All these economic challenges are real, but global monetary liquidity and valuation remain the dominant drivers of equity returns. We believe that

Equities are Attractive Versus Bonds
MSCI World Index January 1988–June 2011



Source: Factset, Causeway Analytics

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The Winning Combination continued

central banks in the mature countries will err on the side of easy money for at least the next few years. Raising interest rates beyond token levels removes critical stimulus from economies staggering under debilitating fiscal expenditure cuts. What central banker wants to be remembered for the Great Recession? We can't think of any. Sustained accommodative monetary policy implies low cost of financing, and bond yields at current levels will prove poor substitutes for equity returns. In the emerging equity markets, interest rate hikes should not derail their economic expansion - or make them less appealing than the mature markets for investment. Growth and apparent fiscal flexibility will cement their position as major repositories for global liquidity. As for valuation, we survey overall markets, as well as the thousands of individual stocks in our weekly value screens. This data gives us confidence in equities, with global developed markets trading at an average two-year forward price-to-earnings ratio of 10.6x. This compares with a 5-year average of 12.5x and a 10-year average of 14.0x. In contrast, stock markets offered much less upside in the 2006 and 2007 credit-induced euphoria.

> **"Europe has some sizable [bank] equity bargains, pockets of economic vitality and reasonably good disclosure."**

Some of the most thoughtful Causeway analysis emanates from our financials research cluster, a subset of our entire research effort. The earnings prospects of banks mirror their respective geographic exposures. We spoke to one of Causeway's fundamental portfolio managers, Conor Muldoon, and bank analysts, Tisha Berman and Alessandro Valentini, for a health check on the global financial system and the potential for contagion in Europe.

Q: Why own any bank stocks in this period of tremendous uncertainty over the euro zone, post-quake Japan, rumblings of enormous loan losses from Chinese provincial debt, overzealous western bank regulators, and dilutive equity issuances?

CM: The answer to why we own any stock is the same: because that stock ranks as one of our highest risk-adjusted return purchase candidates. Today, those prospective returns, if realized, will more than compensate our clients for the volatility. Admittedly, we have no Japanese or Chinese bank exposure in our international and global equity strategies. We would need to see some compelling evidence of a reversal in

Causeway Analysis of Bank Holdings' Sovereign Debt Exposure

		CCM Euro Banks	CCM Other Europe Banks	Total CCM Europe Banks
Weight in Causeway International Value Composite		3.9%	6.1%	10.0%
Risk Weighted Assets (RWA)		$2,284.5	$2,117.5	$4,401.9
Core Tier 1 Capital		$215.7	$241.0	$456.8
Net Exposure	Greece	$8.5	$1.8	$10.3
	Ireland	$0.6	$1.1	$1.7
	Portugal	$5.2	$2.1	$7.3
	Total	$14.3	$5.0	$19.3
Haircut	Greece	50.0%	50.5%	50.0%
	Ireland	26.0%	26.0%	26.0%
	Portugal	22.4%	22.4%	22.4%
After-Tax Loss	Greece	-$2.8	-$0.6	-$3.4
	Ireland	-$0.1	-$0.2	-$0.3
	Portugal	-$0.8	-$0.3	-$1.1
	Total	-$3.6	-$1.1	-$4.7
Core Tier 1 Impact	Greece	0.12%	0.03%	0.08%
	Ireland	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%
	Portugal	0.03%	0.01%	0.02%
(Loss as % of RWA)	Total	0.16%	0.05%	0.11%

Amounts in billions of USD. Composite weight as of 6/24/11; other data as of companies' last reported periods using USD conversion rate as of 06/24/11. RWA and Core Tier 1 as defined under Basel 2.

Source: Causeway data, company reports

The Winning Combination continued

Japan's slow decline. As for China, inadequate domestic bank disclosure makes us cautious. Europe, on the other hand, has some sizable equity bargains, pockets of economic vitality and reasonably good disclosure. We targeted our research on the highest quality diversified banking franchises headquartered in the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden. Causeway's international portfolio holdings consist of large capitalization bank stocks - and none of them call Greece, Portugal, or Ireland home.

Q: How did you assess the risk of holding European banks?

AV: We want to take advantage of market pessimism in instances where we think it is unjustified. In our research process, we stressed our banks' assets, imposing debt default haircuts of 50%, 26%, and 22% for Greek, Irish, and Portuguese government bond holdings, respectively. We used implied default rates from the credit default swap (CDS) spreads in the marketplace. Banks are, by their nature, leveraged. However, this haircut exercise results in minimal impact to our banks' core tier 1 equity capital (between 1 to 33 basis points). This is equivalent to approximately 7% of their combined after-tax annual income. While we seriously question Greece's debt sustainability, we want to make the distinction between the situation in Greece and in the rest of Europe's periphery. For example, while Ireland's debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is 96% with a high fiscal deficit, the country has government-owned assets that could be sold to reduce its debt burden. We have learned that the Irish government purchased real estate assets from its sickly banks at an average 58% discount to book value. These bargain basement property holdings amount to 20% of Irish GDP. We like to see such a sizable financial buffer. Furthermore, Ireland has shown its willingness to make structural changes. Membership in the euro zone has brought immense rewards, especially attracting foreign direct investment. Ireland would likely agree to some type of fiscal union if it led to a sustainable upswing in employment. That's very important. Our analysis shows that the balance sheet positions of our European bank holdings are solid, and, barring a scenario where we witness a breakup of the euro, we are very comfortable with the fundamentals of our banks.

"By committing hundreds of billions of euro to loans and guarantees, Europe has already shown its political willingness to do what is necessary to keep the euro alive."

Q: Aren't your assumed reductions in capital too low if sovereign bond investors shun Italy and Spain, sending government financing costs sky high and creating havoc in the financial services system globally?

TB: We believe Spain and Italy are in better shape than other peripheral European sovereigns. While Spain still must contend with its property bubble, it has shown the political will to make the necessary fiscal changes. The country's budget deficit narrowed by 1.9 percentage points in 2010 and should continue to improve in 2011, given that much of the deficit reduction measures were enacted in the second half of 2010. Italian bond yield spreads over German Bunds are widening, yet we have not seen any deterioration in the fundamentals of Italy. Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio is a formidable 120%, but the country's budget is nearly in surplus territory. The government is currently in the process of passing an incremental correction to the budget and there seems to be bipartisan commitment to achieve a significant deficit correction by 2014. In addition, Italy's private sector balance sheet looks reassuringly healthy, and its sovereign debt market is internally funded. Ok, we admit that all these statistics can get pushed aside by panicky depositors and equally panicky lenders. A chain reaction of defaults in Greek debt (sovereign and bank) damaging confidence in Portugal, Ireland, and possibly Spain and Italy remains a threat, albeit with a low probability. While Portugal, Ireland and Greece represent a relatively insignificant 6% of euro zone GDP, Spain and Italy comprise a substantial 28%. The markets are currently reacting to the recent Portuguese downgrade and to the apparent lack of decisive action by the European Central Bank politicians and regulators. Yes, the market is forcing greater fiscal harmonization in the euro zone, but that is ultimately what a currency union is all about. If contagion spreads, European politicians and electorate will need to make a significant commitment to Europe and the euro. This could mean issuing Eurobonds (guaranteed by all euro zone nations) leading to some fiscal unity. Fiscal unity looks politically challenging, but the current situation of heterogeneous fiscal policies in the euro zone is untenable. By committing hundreds of billions of euro to loans and guarantees, Europe has already shown its political willingness to do what is necessary to keep the euro alive.

The Winning Combination continued

Causeway Bank Holdings Exhibit Underevaluation

	Causeway International Value Equity	MSCI World	MSCI EAFE
Number of Bank Holdings	7	101	80
Market Capitalization ($US Bn)	$79	$65	$63
P/E using FY2 Est	6.9	8.3	7.8
Price/Cash Flow	3.5	4.4	3.9
Price/Book	0.8	1.0	0.9
Price/Revenues	0.9	1.2	1.0

Causeway International Value Representative Account. Holdings as of 06/24/2011.

Source: FactSet

Q: What about the secondary effects of a Greek default (even without contagion) to other countries?

AV: The exposure of our clients' bank holdings to Greek non-government debt (corporate, consumer, and bank debt) is modest. Although the CDS market is notoriously opaque, we understand that most of these swap contracts are collateralized, thus mitigating the risk of losses. The biggest secondary impact of a Greek default would be a spike upward in investor and lender anxiety, raising financing costs for borrowers in Europe and possibly also in the US. Post-2008 and the Lehman shock, policymakers globally have learned a lesson. The lack of confidence in financial institutions can bring about the very demise that policymakers seek to avoid.

> "Shrinking the public sector across Europe, from the UK to Greece, and deregulation will likely become the silver lining to this debt crisis."

Q: Several well-respected economists claim the euro zone is heading for break-up, with the word "inevitable" implied in the headlines. Do you agree?

AV: Our central case remains that the euro survives this and future bouts of speculation. Over time, some euro zone members may leave the monetary union, and new members may enter. As Tisha mentioned, governments have the political will to see the euro survive. However, something more than simple monetary union must glue the members together. Euro zone countries may have no choice but to accept higher fiscal coordination. For example, Italy will give up some level of fiscal sovereignty to maintain access to the common market, which facilitates exports to other euro zone countries on a single currency basis. Additionally, the implications of a euro exit would be disastrous to any of the peripheral countries in terms of soaring inflation and interest rates.

CM: The debt problems in Europe, not to mention in Japan and the US, will take many years to resolve. Meanwhile, the worst offenders must remove the barriers that have made their economies highly uncompetitive. Shrinking the public sector across Europe, from the UK to Greece, and deregulation will likely become the silver lining to this debt crisis. In that scenario, I'd much rather hold equities than fixed income. European banks would likely take the sovereign debt haircuts in stride, with the larger banks able to generate earnings sufficient to absorb losses from debt restructuring. Some of the banks will choose to raise equity to bolster capital. We calculate that most of that earnings dilution is already embedded in European bank share prices.

We don't have all the answers to the fate of peripheral Europe. But we do know that the nervousness over European equities, especially the financials, will dissipate once the decision makers reach a solution to the peripheral sovereign debt crisis. As long-term equity investors, our portfolios are 100% invested. We appreciate that market gyrations cause consternation for some investors, but we have confidence in the financial viability of our investments. Uncertainty typically provides buying opportunities for the patient value investor. In turbulent markets, Causeway attempts to identify stocks with the highest risk-adjusted returns, in a variety of regions and sectors. Equities look very appealing to us in this environment, and careful stock selection has the potential to benefit our clients in the months and years ahead.

CAUSEWAY GLOBAL VALUE EQUITY

Performance (AS OF JUNE 30, 2011)

Annualized for periods greater than one year
Global Value Equity Composite



	YTD	1 Yr	3Yrs	5 Yrs	Inception*
Causeway Gross	11.2%	42.6%	6.4%	4.7%	12.4%
Causeway Net	10.7%	41.4%	5.5%	3.9%	11.6%
MSCI World	5.6%	31.2%	1.0%	2.9%	6.3%

**Inception: September 30, 2001*

Strategy Highlights

PHILOSOPHY
- Active, bottom-up stock selection
- Fundamental research
- Focus on controlling risk-defined as volatility of returns
- Team approach

PROCESS HIGHLIGHTS
- 25 developed markets (United States, EAFE, Canada, South Korea)
- 3,000 stock universe
- Screen by country and industry
- Fundamental analysis
- Validate price target
- Rank stocks by risk/return profile

PORTFOLIO MANAGERS
Sarah Ketterer, Harry Hartford, James Doyle, Jonathan Eng, Kevin Durkin, Conor Muldoon

CAUSEWAY INTERNATIONAL VALUE EQUITY

Performance (AS OF JUNE 30, 2011)

Annualized for periods greater than one year
International Value Equity Composite



	YTD	1 Yr	3Yrs	5 Yrs	Inception*
Causeway Gross	8.1%	35.5%	2.9%	4.0%	9.3%
Causeway Net	7.8%	34.9%	2.4%	3.6%	8.9%
MSCI EAFE®	5.4%	30.9%	-1.3%	2.0%	5.8%

**Inception: June 11, 2001*

Strategy Highlights

PHILOSOPHY
- Active, bottom-up stock selection
- Fundamental research
- Focus on controlling risk- defined as volatility of returns
- Team approach

PROCESS HIGHLIGHTS
- 24 developed markets (EAFE, Canada, South Korea)
- 1,500 stock universe
- Screen by country and industry
- Fundamental analysis
- Validate price target
- Rank stocks by risk/return profile

PORTFOLIO MANAGERS
Sarah Ketterer, Harry Hartford, James Doyle, Jonathan Eng, Kevin Durkin, Conor Muldoon

CAUSEWAY EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY

Performance (AS OF JUNE 30, 2011)

Annualized for periods greater than one year
Emerging Markets Equity Composite



	YTD	1 Yr	2Yrs	3 Yrs	Inception*
Causeway Gross	3.4%	39.1%	34.2%	6.7%	6.8%
Causeway Net	2.9%	37.7%	32.9%	5.6%	5.7%
MSCI EM	1.0%	28.2%	25.8%	4.5%	4.6%

**Inception: April 30, 2007*

Strategy Highlights

PHILOSOPHY
- Actively managed, tracking-error oriented, quantitative emerging markets strategy
- Combines bottom-up and top-down factors in security selection
- Risk control
  • Constrain country/sector weights versus benchmark
  • Use proprietary quantitative tools

PROCESS HIGHLIGHTS
- 24 emerging markets
- 1,200 stock universe
- Employ stock ranking and risk models designed for emerging markets
- Use optimization to maximize expected return per unit of risk

PORTFOLIO MANAGERS
Arjun Jayaraman, MacDuff Kuhnert

CAUSEWAY GLOBAL ABSOLUTE RETURN

Performance (AS OF JUNE 30, 2011)

Annualized for periods greater than one year
Global Absolute Returns Composite



	Inception*
Causeway Gross	4.77%
Causeway Net	4.16%
BoFAML 90 T-Bills	0.06%

**Inception: February 28, 2011*

Strategy Highlights

PHILOSOPHY
- Combines separate investment processes: fundamental (long) and quantitive (short) sources of alpha

PROCESS HIGHLIGHTS
- Global developed market value equity (long/short)
- Fundamental long (typically 35-55 exposures), 2-3 year time horizon
- Quantitive short (typically 50-125 exposures), 3-6 month time horizon
- Dollar value of longs approximately equals dollar value of shorts
- Typically low or no correlation to the MSCI World Index

PORTFOLIO MANAGERS
Sarah Ketterer, Harry Hartford, James Doyle, Jonathan Eng, Kevin Durkin, Conor Muldoon, Arjun Jayaraman, MacDuff Kuhnert

CAUSEWAY GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES

Performance (AS OF JUNE 30, 2011)

Annualized for periods greater than one year
Global Opportunities Composite



	Inception*
Causeway Gross	0.59%
Causeway Net	0.34%
MSCI ACWI	0.38%

Inception: February 28, 2011

Strategy Highlights

PHILOSOPHY

- Combines active fundamental global developed markets strategy with active quantitative emerging markets strategy

PROCESS HIGHLIGHTS

- Uses a quantitive asset allocation strategy to determine exposures to developed and emerging markets
- Meticulous fundamental research
- Active, bottom-up stock selection
- Disciplined quantitve approach with fundamental underpinnings
- Proprietary risk models developed in-house

PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

Sarah Ketterer, Harry Hartford, James Doyle, Jonathan Eng, Kevin Durkin, Conor Muldoon, Arjun Jayaraman, MacDuff Kuhnert

CAUSEWAY INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

Performance (AS OF JUNE 30, 2011)

Annualized for periods greater than one year
International Opportunities Composite



	YTD	1 Yr	2 Yrs	3 Yrs	Inception*
Causeway Gross	7.2%	35.1%	26.4%	4.1%	0.5%
Causeway Net	7.1%	34.7%	26.0%	3.8%	0.2%
MSCI ACWI Ex US	4.1%	30.3%	20.2%	0.1%	-1.5 %

Inception: June 30, 2007

Strategy Highlights

PHILOSOPHY

- Combines active fundamental international developed markets strategy with active quantitative emerging markets strategy

PROCESS HIGHLIGHTS

- Uses a quantitative asset allocation strategy to determine exposures to developed and emerging markets
- Meticulous fundamental research
- Active, bottom-up stock selection
- Disciplined quantitative approach with fundamental underpinnings
- Proprietary risk models developed in-house

PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

Sarah Ketterer, Harry Hartford, James Doyle, Jonathan Eng, Kevin Durkin, Conor Muldoon, Arjun Jayaraman, MacDuff Kuhnert

Important Disclosures

The Firm, Causeway Capital Management LLC ("Causeway"), is organized as a Delaware limited liability company and began operations in June 2001. It is registered as an investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Causeway manages international value equity, global value equity and emerging markets equity assets for corporations, pension plans, public retirement plans, Taft-Hartley pension plans, endowments and foundations, mutual funds, charities, private trusts and funds, wrap fee programs, and other institutions. The firm includes all accounts managed by Causeway.

Causeway Capital Management LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®).

The International Value Equity Composite ("International Composite") includes all international value equity, U.S. Dollar denominated, discretionary accounts, which contain typically 50 to 80 holdings, do not apply a minimum market capitalization requirement of $2.5 billion or higher ($5 billion or higher prior to November 2008), include investments in South Korean companies after October 2003, do not experience significant regular external cash flows, and are not constrained by socially responsible investment restrictions. The international value equity strategy seeks long-term growth of capital and income through investment primarily in equity securities of companies in developed countries located outside the U.S. From June 2001 through November 2001, the International Composite included a non-fee-paying account with total assets of approximately $2 million. This was the sole account in the International Composite from June through September 2001. The account was included in the International Composite at account inception because it was fully invested at inception. The benchmark is the MSCI EAFE® Index.

The Global Value Equity Composite ("Global Composite") includes all global value equity, U.S. Dollar denominated, discretionary accounts, which are not constrained by socially responsible investment restrictions. Through March 30, 2007, Causeway managed the Global Composite using research and recommendations regarding U.S. value stocks from an unaffiliated investment advisory firm under a research services agreement for an asset-based fee. The global value equity strategy seeks long-term growth of capital and income through investment primarily in equity securities of companies in developed countries located outside the U.S. and of companies located in the U.S. The benchmark is the MSCI World Index.

The Emerging Markets Equity Composite includes all emerging markets equity, U.S. Dollar denominated, discretionary accounts, which contain typically 70 to 120 holdings, and apply a minimum market capitalization requirement of generally $500 million or higher at the time of initial investment. The emerging markets equity strategy seeks long-term growth of capital through investment primarily in equity securities of companies in emerging markets using a quantitative investment approach. The benchmark is the MSCI Emerging Markets Index.

The International Opportunities Composite includes all International Opportunities, U.S. dollar denominated, discretionary accounts. The International Opportunities strategy seeks long-term growth of capital through investment primarily in equity securities of companies in developed and emerging markets outside the U.S. using Causeway's asset allocation methodology to determine developed and emerging weightings, and using Causeway's international value equity strategy or Causeway International Value Fund for the developed portion of the portfolio and Causeway's emerging markets strategy or Causeway Emerging Markets Fund for the emerging markets portion of the portfolio. The benchmark is the MSCI All Country World Index ex U.S.

The Global Opportunities Composite includes all global opportunities, U.S. dollar denominated, discretionary accounts. The global opportunities strategy seeks long-term growth of capital through investment primarily in equity securities of companies in developed and emerging markets outside the U.S. and of companies located in the U.S. using Causeway's asset allocation methodology to determine developed and emerging weightings, and using Causeway's global value equity strategy or Causeway Global Value Fund for the developed portion of the portfolio and Causeway's emerging markets strategy or Causeway Emerging Markets Fund for the emerging markets portion of the portfolio. The benchmark is the MSCI All Country World Index.

The Global Absolute Return Composite includes all discretionary accounts in the global absolute return ("GAR") strategy. The GAR strategy seeks long-term growth of capital with low or no correlation to the MSCI World Index through investment in long and short exposures to common and preferred stocks of companies in developed countries located outside the U.S. and of companies located in the U.S. The benchmark is the BofA Merrill Lynch 3-Month U.S. Treasury Bill Index. The GAR strategy obtains long and short exposures to securities directly and/or using swap agreements. The strategy will use leverage up to four times total assets. The use of leverage is speculative and will magnify any losses. Short positions will lose money if the price of the underlying security increases, and losses on shorts are therefore potentially unlimited. The strategy involves significant expenses including financing charges and transaction costs which will reduce investment returns and increase investment losses. To the extent swap agreements are used, the strategy risks loss of the amount due under a swap agreement if the counterparty defaults. To the extent assets are held by a prime broker, recovery will be limited in the event of the prime broker's insolvency. The strategy involves liquidity risks since a portfolio may not be able to exit security exposures immediately, particularly during periods of market turmoil.

New accounts are included in the Composites after the first full month under management, except as noted for the International Composite above. Terminated accounts are included in the Composites through the last full month under management. Account returns are calculated daily. Monthly account returns are calculated by geometrically linking the daily returns. The returns of the Composites are calculated monthly by weighting monthly account returns by the beginning market values. Valuations and returns are computed and stated in U.S. dollars. Returns include the reinvestment of interest, dividends, and any capital gains. Returns are calculated gross of withholding taxes on dividends, interest income, and capital gains. Additional information regarding the firm's policies for valuing, calculating and reporting returns is available upon request. Gross-of-fees returns are presented before management, performance-based and custody fees, but after trading expenses. Net-of-fees returns are presented after the deduction of actual management fees, performance-based fees and all trading expenses, but before custody fees.

Past performance is no guarantee of future performance. In addition to the normal risks associated with investing, international investments may involve risk of capital loss from unfavorable fluctuation in currency values, from differences in generally accepted accounting principles or from economic or political instability in other nations. Emerging markets involve heightened risks related to the same factors as well as increased volatility and lower trading volume.

The (MSCI EAFE® Index is an arithmetical average weighted by market value of the performance of approximately 1,000 non-U.S. companies representing 22 stock markets in Europe, Australasia, New Zealand and the Far East. Portfolios in the International Composite invest in Canada and South Korea, which countries are not included in the MSCI EAFE® Index. The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index, designed to measure developed market equity performance, consisting of 24 developed country indexes, including the U.S. Portfolios in the Global Composite invest in South Korea, which is not included in the MSCI World Index. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index, designed to measure equity market performance in the global emerging markets. The MSCI All Country World Index ex U.S. is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed and emerging markets excluding the U.S. The MSCI All Country World Index benchmark is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed and emerging markets. The BofA Merrill Lynch 3-Month U.S. Treasury Bill Index is comprised of a single issue purchased at the beginning of the month and held for a full month. Each month the index is rebalanced and the issue selected is the outstanding Treasury Bill that matures closest to, but not beyond 3 months from, the rebalancing date. The Treasury Bills comprising the Index are guaranteed by the U.S. government as to the timely payment of interest and principal. While accounts in the GAR strategy may invest a portion of their assets in Treasury Bills, accounts will primarily be exposed to notional positions in securities that will not be similarly guaranteed by the U.S. government. The Indices are gross of withholding taxes, assume reinvestment of dividends and capital gains, and assume no management, custody, transaction or other expenses. It is not possible to invest directly in these indices.

Contact Sarah Van Ness at 310-231-6127 or vanness@causewaycap.com to request a complete list and description of firm composites and/or a presentation that adheres to the GIPS® standards.

Market Commentary

The market commentary expresses the portfolio managers' views as of 7/14/11 and should not be relied on as research or investment advice regarding any stock. These views and portfolio holdings and characteristics are subject to change. There is no guarantee that any forecasts made will come to pass. Any portfolio securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for client accounts. The reader should not assume that an investment in the securities identified was or will be profitable.